

Military Government

Weekly

Information Bulletin



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT (U. S. ZONE)
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

REPORTS AND INFORMATION BRANCH

23 OCTOBER 1945



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WEEKLY

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT LETTERS AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED DURING THE WEEK

Amendments to the Directive to Commanding Generals, Military Districts, dated 7 July 1945, Subject: Administration of Military Government in the U. S. Zone of Germany.

Control Council Laws Nos. 4 and 5 issued as annexes "J-4" and "J-5" of Section XXIV 1 November 1945 (file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO)

Amendment to Part 5 (Wages, Hours and Labor Standards) of Section XV (Manpower), including Control Council Directive No. 14 (Directive on Wage Policy) 31 October 1945 (file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO)

Control Council Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2 issued as annexes "I-2" and "I-3" of Section XXIV 29 October 1945 (file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO)

Amendment to Part 1 (Education) of Section VII (Education and Religious Affairs) 5 November 1945 (file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO)

Amendment to Paragraph 153 (Pay of Prisoners of War), "Handbook, Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany" 5 November 1945

Amendment to Nationality Act of 1940 3 November 1945 (file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO)

Identification and Documentation of Foreigners in Germany 5 November 1945 (file AG 322.01 GEC-AGO)

Property Control Accounting 2 November 1945 (file AG 014.1 GEC-AGO)

Regional Government Co-ordinating Office 2 November 1945 (file AG 322 GEC-AGO)

Instructions on Posting of Official Notice to Defendants (at the Nürnberg trials) 31 October 1945 (file GEC 415)

Increase of Income Tax, Wage Tax and Corporation Tax 30 October 1945 (file AG 012 GEC-AGO)

Patent Matters and Patent Practice 29 October 1945 (file GEC 072)

Instructions to Military Government Finance Officers No. 2 and No. 3 22 October 1945 (file GEC 100 [Germany])

Privileges of Soviet Liaison Officers in Displaced Persons Camps Other Than Wholly Soviet 5 November 1945 (file AG 091.713 GEC-AGO)

AN EDITORIAL FROM "THE BAVARIAN"

In its issue of the 23rd of October, the BAVARIAN, weekly paper published by the Third Military Government Regiment, printed the editorial which is reproduced below, in its entirety:

Military Government policy in American-occupied Germany has frequently been the target of severe criticism by both on-the-scene and off-the-scene observers ever since the spearhead elements nailed up their Military Government shingles and commenced local government administration in the first German towns and cities captured by American troops.

The initial period of administering law and order was one of varied problems, many of which could not be foreseen when the original plans, organization and policy for the occupation of Germany were agreed upon. However, the determined manner in which Military Government officials and personnel plunged into the tremendous task ahead of them certainly left no doubt in anyone's mind as to their deep concern toward achieving the basic aims of the occupation. There were days, weeks, and months of endless work. There have been inconceivable obstacles to be faced and overcome. The nature of these problems, and the methods employed in solving them has been in most cases, far beyond the comprehension of persons whose work has not been directly related with military government.

It is not to be denied that mistakes have been made. But when critics play up a few frailties in administration as an overall indication of inconsistency in military government policy and motives in Germany, it is in direct contrast to the splendid results which have been achieved. Such criticism utterly disregards the conscientious efforts and convictions of all those who have been responsible for conducting Civil Affairs operations on a scale without precedent in military annals.

We, in Military Government know full well the importance of our mission in Germany. In the early days of the occupation, the lessons learned provided a helpful supplement for future action. The Tripartite Meeting at Potsdam settled many controversial issues as to the policy and aims of governing the defeated Germans, after which General Eisenhower himself issued the plans for the occupation to the German people in his message on August 6.

The definite objectives of the occupation policy must and are being attained with the least possible delay. Anyone with even the faintest idea of the groggy, beaten, mutilated, disorganized spectacle that was Germany after VE-Day would know it wasn't a job that could be completed overnight. Progress relied considerably on the ability of the German people themselves to emerge from the chaos and provide momentum to the wheels of political, economic and domestic reconstruction which Military Government set in motion.

If there is anyone in Military Government today who does not wholeheartedly and conscientiously believe in the promulgation and efficient fulfillment of the responsibilities assigned to him as a representative of our government and our people back home, then he does not belong in Military Government. Long and tedious work has gone into the successful efforts to inaugurate and maintain an orderly and well-managed government in Bavaria and other allocated American occupied sections of Germany. Because we have accomplished so much, it is essential that we continue to fulfill our present responsibilities in Military Government.

We who recognize those responsibilities as an obligation and a duty, must and shall continue to prove mistaken those critics who have been attacking our motives with accusations that we don't believe in the work we are doing.

Then, too, there is also the old saying, 'If the shoe fits, wear it.'

COAL

A Black Diamond is the Keystone of Germany's Efforts to Survive

THE reconstruction of European economy, shattered and largely disintegrated after six years of total war, is today a jig-saw puzzle with perhaps the key piece that which represents the black diamond, coal. Until that piece has been set into position all the other phases of European life must remain dislocated and unstable, for coal represents the vital element without which only a primitive economy is possible.

Twentieth Century life in Europe has been so closely integrated with machine power, so tightly geared to industrial production that the destruction of that power, the paralysis of that production, inevitably affects virtually every aspect of the daily lives of the people of Europe.

Industrial production is based upon machine power; machine power is based upon fuel; and the most common, the most versatile, and the most necessary source of that fuel is coal. Electricity, gas, and water, the most vital of public utilities require coal for their production or preparation for consumer use. Coal drives the machines which convert wheat to flour, and fires the ovens which bake that flour into bread. Coal is needed to produce the finished lumber, the bricks, the glass, the roofing for the repair of homes. Above all, the distribution of food, of manufactured articles, of raw materials, of coal itself is dependent upon transportation, the greatest proportion of which, rail transport, is coal-driven. In brief, a stable and ba-

anced economy, the prerequisite of peace, can be achieved only when sufficient coal is available to power the machines on which that economy is built.

Coal represents at this time perhaps the most perplexing problem faced by the administrators of military government in Germany, for the vast majority of all other problems in one way or another are affected by the coal situation. Were more coal available, food stringencies could be eased by increased production of processed foods. The solution to the crucial housing problem might also be easier were more coal available to produce vital construction material.

The problem is further complicated by international considerations, for the war which Germany brought upon Europe wreaked havoc with the economy of all other European nations as well as that of Germany itself. The countries of western Europe, thoroughly exploited in the course of German occupation, are also in urgent need of reconstruction and rehabilitation and their requirements represent an added complication.

GERMANY: GREATEST CONTINENTAL COAL PRODUCER

In order to obtain a picture of the coal situation in western Europe at

this time, it is necessary to have an understanding of pre-war coal conditions. In 1938, Germany was far and away the largest coal producing nation on the European Continent, and after the United States and the British Isles, the world's third largest producer. Its production of bituminous coal alone was more than double that of France, Belgium, and Holland combined. In addition, Germany in 1935 mined 72 per cent of the world's brown coal production. Germany thus was able in 1938 to export more than 32 million metric tons of coal, while in the same year France was importing almost 21 million tons.

German Coal Production is at Low Ebb, Limited by Manpower Shortages and Outmoded Equipment

In 1938, therefore, when German coal production was able to support a thriving industrial economy and a vast mechanized war machine which was constantly expanding, it could still export more than one-sixth of its hard coal production. Today that production has collapsed, and the demands placed upon Germany for coal to provide for the military needs of the four occupying powers, for export to the liberated nations, and for the minimum essential civilian requirements in Germany have thus far proved too great.

The major problem can actually be broken down into three sub-problems. First, the production of coal must be increased. Second, coal produced must be so allocated as to yield maximum results. Third, transportation must be rehabilitated and increased to insure a constant movement from the mines to the consumers.


The problem of increasing German coal production is primarily a French

and British responsibility, for the major coal producing areas of Germany, which are presently supplying coal to the United States Zone, lie in the French and British occupation zones. In 1938, for example, the Ruhr and Aachen coal fields (British Zone) produced approximately 72 per cent of the total German hard coal production, and the Saar mines (French Zone) produced another eight per cent. As for brown coal, the only major field in the western zones lies near Cologne (British Zone) and produced in 1938 approximately 21 per cent of the German coal total. Although the U. S. Zone possesses brown coal deposits in Great Hesse and in Bavaria, and some hard coal is also mined in Bavaria, in terms of German total production, pre-war production figures from the American Zone were insignificant.

Net pithead production of hard coal in the three occupation zones of Western Germany during September, though representing a considerable increase over July production, was only approximately 27 per cent of the average monthly production during 1938. Brown coal production had, at the same time, risen to about 55 per cent of the 1938 monthly average. The greater increase in brown coal production is due primarily to the fact that brown coal mines, lying close to the earth's surface, can be worked by open-pit methods which are much simpler to operate.

**MINE RECRUITMENT DRIVE
LAUNCHED**

The greatest limiting factor in coal production at present is that of manpower. The war actually caused relatively little destruction of the German mines, but the liberation of the foreign workers, who had formed the largest proportion of mine employees, brought pit production almost to a standstill in



Photos by U. S. Army Signal Corps

Brown coal, when mined, has a high moisture content and deteriorates rapidly unless processed. Therefore, substantial transportation costs for raw brown coal cannot be justified. Approximately 50 per cent of total output is used in the raw by power plants contiguous to the mines. Of the total output, 24 per cent is used to process the remaining 26 per cent, which is accomplished by dehydration in high-pressure hydraulic presses. Eighty-five per cent of all brown coal mines are open-cut.

April and May. It is estimated that before the war ended, approximately 60 per cent of the 400,000 workers employed in the hard coal mines of Western Germany were foreign "slave" laborers, and upon their liberation it became apparent that immediate attention had to be given to the replacement of this force by German labor. Accordingly, high priority was given to the discharge of experienced miners from the German prisoners of war in Allied hands. In addition, an intensive recruiting drive for miners was initiated by Military Government authorities through the local German labor offices.

Despite intensive procurement efforts, rapid amelioration of the manpower shortages is difficult, for the native labor force was widely scattered during the war, and many former workers were killed or disabled.

Considerable difficulty has been encountered in overcoming the obvious reluctance of German labor to go into the mines. Emergency steps to increase incentive were required, and as early as July 4th SHAEF authorized the increase of food rations for miners to 3,000 calories per day for surface workers and 3,400 for underground workers as compared with the daily ration of approximately 1,500 calories for the normal civilian consumer. Further steps were necessary, however, and on August 12th USFET authorized the increase of food rations to 3,600 and 4,000 calories if necessary. Furthermore, the cable to both the Western and Eastern Military Districts, demanding immediate increase in production of coal in the U.S. Zone to the highest possible figure, stated: "To insure this production, maximum assistance will be given the mines in securing of sufficient rations and clothes for miners . . . in obtaining additional miners, (and the) transportation of miners to and from work." It further authorized the use of Ameri-

can military stocks to supplement civilian stocks when necessary, and preferential issue of clothing and other items to "stimulate production".

In the British-operated Ruhr mines, and in the French Saar mines, additional incentive has been granted miners by allowing them a small percentage of their production for their own use.

By the end of August, these incentives and the accelerated labor drive had brought approximately 50 per cent of the pre-war mine manpower total back to work. The daily production of that labor was, however, only about one-half that of the pre-war miners. By simple arithmetic, one-half the required labor, producing at one-half the pre-war rate would result in only 25 per cent maximum production, a figure which almost exactly coincides with the current 27 per cent production rate in the hard coal mines of Western Germany.

EQUIPMENT OBSOLETE

Even at the peak of German hard-coal production, German underground mines had not been mechanized to the degree attained in either Britain or the United States. Today, German mine machinery is outmoded, and war-time depreciation has rendered much of this machinery inadequate. Consequently, mechanical acceleration of coal production is virtually impossible as the mines are neither adapted to new mining procedures, nor is the present machinery capable of withstanding increased strain. Furthermore, even were modern machinery available, experienced and skilled technicians required to operate it could not immediately be found in the current mine labor force.

A possibly depressing factor on the coal production rate may lie in the fact that, at present production rates, only a small proportion of that production is allocated for German civilian use. Since the German miner knows that the largest part of the coal he mines is

going either to the military forces of the four occupying powers or is being exported to the liberated nations, he tends to be reluctant to exert himself. The answer to this may lie in the realization that once these prior claims are met, any increase in production will be solely for German benefit.

The graph reproduced below gives a clear picture of the extent and seriousness of the coal production problem. In the course of less than one year, from D-Day in June 1944 to April 1945, production fell from over 12,000,000 metric tons to slightly less than 1,000,000 tons per month. Since in September, only 2,060,000 metric tons (slightly more than 67 per cent) V-E Day, production has almost tripled, but there is still an extremely long road to go before pre-war production is approached.

It must be emphasized in discussing net pit production of coal, that more than 22 per cent of the Ruhr coal production, for example, is consumed in the mine operations, and another ten per cent is lost in the conversion of that coal to coke and briquettes. Thus, of the 2,978,142 metric tons of net pit production in the Ruhr hard coal mines


of net merchantable coal, coke, and patent fuel were produced. In brown coal production, due to the inferior quality of the coal, the loss is considerably greater. Of the August 1945 brown coal production in the western zones, (1,952,000 metric tons), only 26 per cent (515,000 tons) of processed solid fuels were produced.

Sharing the limited supply and satisfying minimum requirements involves Quadripartite Action.

The second of the coal sub-problems is that of coal allocation. It is, in effect, a matter of quadripartite rationing. Allocations can be classified in four categories. Top priority goes to the coal requirements of the military forces and the railroads of the four occupying powers. When those requirements have been satisfied, the remaining unallocated coal must be divided between the liberated Western European countries and the essential civilian needs of the German economy.

Allocations are made monthly by the Fuels committee of the Economic

HARD COAL PRODUCTION IN WESTERN GERMANY (NET PITHEAD BASIS)



Our Efforts to beat the Swords into Ploughshares require the Industrial Energy which only Coal can Provide.

Directorate of the Allied Control Authority. Each of the occupying authorities submits its estimated requirements, both military and civilian, and the quadripartite Technical Staff of the Fuels Committee, on the basis of the estimated available coal production and transportation for all four zones, then makes its allocations. In addition, directives issued by the governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom to their respective zone commanders established a requirement that 10,000,000 tons of coal be exported from the three zones to the liberated countries by the end of the calendar year, and that an additional 15,000,000 tons be exported to those nations in the first four months of 1946.

An analysis of the estimated coal requirements for November for the U. S. Zones of Germany and Austria (only part of the Austrian requirements are met from German coal supplies) and the actual November allocations reveals the extent to which the estimated requirements are met.

NOVEMBER COAL REQUIREMENTS (U. S. ZONE)

		Per Cent
Military (Germany):	539,942	27.2
Railways	278,835	14.0
Inland Waterways	47,337	2.5
Bremen Port Opns	20,500	1.0
Troops, Germany	193,270	9.7
U. S. Zone, Austria	94,242*	4.7
Essential Civilian Use	1,353,539	68.1
TOTAL	1,987,723	100

NOVEMBER COAL ALLOCATIONS (U. S. ZONE)

		Per Cent
Military (Germany):	540,200	46.7
Railways	279,000	24.2
Inland Waterways	47,400	4.1
Bremen Port Opns	20,500	1.7
Troops, Germany	193,300	16.7
U. S. Zone, Austria	60,000*	5.2
Essential Civilian Use	549,500	48.1
TOTAL	1,149,700	100

* Austria figures represent combined military and essential civilian use categories.

It is obvious from the above, that when allocations do not equal the submitted requirements, it is the essential civilian use category which suffers the loss. Thus, where the military requirements are met with a 100 per cent allocation, the allocations for essential German use are almost 60 per cent below the estimated requirements.

Military requirements are consolidated by the armies and submitted to the Allied Control Authority. By agreement among the four occupying powers, allocation for space heating is made at the rate of eight pounds of coal per man per day. Other military requirements are prepared by the services concerned — the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the Office of the Chief Quartermaster — with the restriction that no more than a 30-day stockpile be accumulated.

The requirements for essential civilian use are estimated by the local German Economics offices and are submitted through Military Government channels. First priority is given to public utilities requirements, with lower priorities for food-processing plants, construction-material industries, etc. Higher priorities are given to plants producing material for army contracts than to those producing civilian consumer goods.

The Allied Control Authority allocations for railroads, military and essential civilian use are made in bulk, and the responsibility for the distribution of the shipments made against the bulk allocations for essential civilian use rests on the authorities within each zone.


The graph reproduced below shows the changing pattern of coal allocations

from August to November. As transportation and coal production improved, the proportion of production earmarked for export to the liberated countries increased from 21 per cent in August to 28 per cent in November. Similarly, allocations to the railroads have increased with the rehabilitation of the lines, and military allocations have increased with the approach of winter and the greater need of coal for space heating. As the inevitable result of the increases in allocations for other categories, allocations for essential civilian use have noticeably declined.

Approximately 90 per cent of the November coal allocation for the U. S. Zone is from British Zone production in the Ruhr and Cologne mines. Sixty thousand tons have been allocated for railway use from the Saar, and the total American Zone production is also included in the November allocations for U. S. use. Should production in the U. S. Zone rise above the allocated figure, the increase would represent a net gain for use within the zone.

The difference between the estimated requirements and allocations and the actual deliveries for essential civilian use is a constant source of trouble for Military Government officials. If not enough coal is allocated or delivered, some phase of military government planning must be revised. Maximum activity of food-processing plants and building material factories is vital to the achievement of the maximum food production and winterization plans of Military Government. Coal shortages threaten the operation of those plans. At Ludwigsburg, for example, an "ersatz" coffee plant was unable to meet its shipment commitments to Berlin for lack of coal and coke. Similarly, production of tile, lime, cement, gypsum and slate — all urgently needed construction materials — has been held up in Bavaria because of coal shortages. Again, plans for the extraction of 40,000 tons of sugar from a 300,000 ton sugar beet crop would be severely jeopardized by a delay of even one month in the arrival of the required amount of coal at the extraction plants.

**MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS OF SOLID FUELS
PRODUCED IN WESTERN ZONES
(BY PURPOSE)**



Since requirements are estimated several months in advance, changing conditions may completely alter the picture by the time shipments against the allocations are made. When shipments actually arrive, Military Government officials frequently find it necessary to reassign the coal from the user for whom the coal was originally required, to another consumer who currently has a higher priority. The unlikelihood of allocations equaling requirements, and the present inability to depend upon shipments to equal allocations, make it impossible to create a stable, regular coal utilization program for essential German civilian use. Furthermore, it is frequently the cause of overestimated requirements, the result of which is an even greater disproportion between the estimated needs and the actual deliveries.

Destroyed Bridges, Blocked Waterways, Wrecked Rolling Stock, are Major Obstacles to our Efforts to Transport Coal into the U. S. Zone.

The third, and unquestionably the most perplexing aspect of the entire problem at present is that of transportation. Since, as mentioned above, more than 90 per cent of the coal supply for the U. S. Zone must be carried from the British and French Zones, it is obvious that unless the transportation system is capable of carrying all the coal which has been allocated, it is impossible to satisfy even the minimum coal requirements of the Zone. To date, the transportation system has not succeeded in meeting the demands placed upon it, and with the approach of winter it is more difficult for improvement to be made.

The present inadequacy of the transportation system serving the U. S. Zone

is a direct result of the war. American strategic bombing reached its peak of effectiveness in its disruption of the German rail system including locomotives and other rolling stock. In addition, in their withdrawal into the heart of Germany, the German armies almost completely destroyed the vital German inland waterways system by the systematic destruction of virtually every bridge which spanned the Rhine, the Main, and the Neckar, and the wrecking of the key connecting canals. By V-E Day, no other single factor in the German economy had been so completely and effectively paralyzed as German transportation. Herculean effort in the past six months has brought order from chaos, but transportation is still one of the most serious problems confronting the American army.

To analyze the relationship between the coal and transportation problems, it is necessary to consider separately both rail and inland waterways transportation.

Before the war, the German inland waterways system was one of the most highly organized networks in Europe. A vast program of canal building had linked the principal German rivers, and it was possible to ship goods by barge from the mouth of the Rhine through the length of Germany into Austria via the Rhine-Main-Danube canal which linked the three rivers, or from the Ruhr to Berlin via the great Mittelland canal. The particular importance of the inland waterways with respect to coal cannot be overemphasized. It is estimated that before the war approximately 70 per cent of all internal coal shipments were carried over the inland waterways network.

Today, that network is capable of carrying only a minute fraction of its

pre-war volume. The Rhine, the most important German river, is now open from its mouth to Karlsruhe, but its estimated capacity from the Ruhr to the U. S. Zone for November and December is a meager 150,000 tons per month. Were the entire lift to consist of coal alone, the 150,000 ton total would represent only about five per cent of the present Ruhr hard coal production!

There are several limiting factors in the present use of the Rhine. The destruction of the bridges and the consequent damming up of the river, resulted in many changes in the river's channel. Consequently, even the most experienced barge skipper must now pilot his

barge through completely changed stretches of the river. Furthermore, though a particular stretch may be declared cleared at any particular time, the flow of the river often brings with it new obstructions to block the previously cleared channel.

Another limitation is caused by the relatively low water level of the Rhine. Barges cannot now be loaded to capacity, and the resulting loss frequently runs as high as twenty per cent of the actual barge capacity.

Not only did the Germans effectively destroy their bridges, but an almost equally efficient job was done in sinking the essential coal barges. Although sufficient barges are available now to

(Continued on Page 16)



Photo by U. S. Army Signal Corps

Typical of the obstacles in the race to transport coal is the Urmitz Bridge, north of Koblenz, where shifting currents moved underwater steel sections to cause a new obstruction. The channel, now clear, is not yet being used because of the river's low water level. 20,000 tons of coal, loaded in barges at Duisburg, is unable to move.

Inland Waterways and Railroads Serving the U.S. Zone of Germany

INLAND WATERWAYS

The principal inland waterways of Western Germany which serve or lie within the U.S. Zone are the Rhine, Main, Neckar, and Danube rivers, and the Rhine-Main-Danube-Canal.

The **Rhine** has long been Germany's principal waterway. On its banks lie some of Germany's most important industrial centers, cities such as Duisburg, Düsseldorf, and Cologne in the north, and Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, and Karlsruhe in the south. At present, the river is open from the North Sea to Karlsruhe, but its low water level and the necessity for continued bridge repair and channel clearing limits the upstream lift capacity to 150,000 tons, only a fraction of the river's pre-war traffic.

The **Main** River, one of the two principal tributaries of the Rhine, links the important cities of Mainz, Frankfurt, Aschaffenburg, and Würzburg by water to the coal and iron cities of the Ruhr. Although the river is open as far as Würzburg, limited transport is possible only as far as Aschaffenburg, principally as the result of the extremely low water level of the river.

The **Neckar**, southernmost of the Rhine tributaries, is currently blocked for most of its length, with traffic possible only as far as Heidelberg. The twin industrial cities of Ludwigshafen and Mannheim are situated at the confluence of the Rhine and Neckar. Although there is little expectation of improvement in clearing the Neckar before spring, when the River is finally opened, the important industrial cities of Württemberg, Heilbronn and Stuttgart will be linked to the Rhine.

The Rhine-Main-Danube Canal is not yet in operation and thus direct traffic from northern Germany to Austria by water is not yet possible.

RAILROADS

Although the major limiting factor on rail transportation in western Germany today is the acute shortage of rolling stock, the German rail network is not yet completely restored. Various sections of

the different rail lines are capable of carrying far heavier tonnages than other stretches of the same line.


From the daily tonnage capacity aspect, there are three major lines now serving the U.S. Zone, each with a greater than 16,000 - ton daily capacity in each direction. The longest of these runs from Bremerhaven via Hannover, Wittenhausen, Bebra, and Schlüchtern to Hanau is the vital supply link between the Bremen Sub-District and the U. S. Zone. The second is a key coal supply route, the line running from the Ruhr to Kassel, and Giessen to Hanau. The third and shortest line in this capacity is the direct line from Würzburg to Nürnberg.

In the 12,000- to 15,000- ton daily capacity class are four lines, one of which, the line from Nürnberg via Regensburg and Passau to Austria is one of the two major rail supply routes from Germany to Austria. Of equal capacity is the important Ruhr-Giessen line which carries Ruhr coal to the U. S. Zone. Two lines entirely within the U.S. Zone of Germany in this class are those from Darmstadt via Aschaffenburg and Gemünden to Würzburg, and from Würzburg via Bamberg to Nürnberg.

In addition, a line from the Saar and Aachen coal fields which transports important quantities of coal into the U. S. Zone via Mainz and Hanau can also carry similar tonnages.

The principal rail line connecting North Württemberg-Baden and Bavaria has a slightly lower daily capacity. Actually starting at Frankfurt, it connects Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, Ulm and Augsburg and is capable of carrying 10,000 to 11,000 tons daily in both directions.

The vital rail supply route to Berlin actually consists of three sections. From the port of Bremerhaven to Hannover, the rail line can carry over 16,000 tons daily in each direction, but the section from Hannover via Brunswick and Helmstedt to Magdeburg has less than half that capacity, and from Magdeburg to Berlin, the line, partly single track, can carry only 7,500 tons daily.



meet the present limited capacity of the inland waterways, the shortage of barges will be acutely felt as river clearance progresses.

In the U. S. Zone, every effort is being made to increase the possible flow along the waterways system, but the approach of winter makes it unlikely that much improvement can be achieved before spring.

RAILROADS BEARING PRESENT LOAD

The German rail network is now forced to carry the greatest part of the coal transportation burden. Great progress in road and bridge repair has been made in the past half year, and today the limiting factor is principally the acute scarcity of rolling stock, particularly freight cars.

The projected rail shipments of coal for the U. S. Zones of Germany and Austria for the month of November total just over one million tons. Taking an average coal car capacity of twenty tons (it is often estimated as low as eighteen), approximately 50,000 individual car loadings are required to accomplish the total shipments.

The shortage of cars had become so critical by October that a ten-day embargo was placed on all loading, diverting, and re-consigning of rail cars in order to accomplish the greatest amount of unloading and consequent freeing of tied-up cars. Only shipments of coal, and cars carrying shipments to U. S. Forces in Austria and Berlin were excepted from the embargo.

The car shortage is, of course, accentuated by delays in turn-around time. Shipments from the British Zone to the U. S. Zone are made by the train, and after a 40-car train arrives at its central destination in the U. S. Zone, very often there is considerable delay before the

individual cars can be re-routed to the eventual consumer for unloading and return.

During September and the first two weeks of October, shipments from the Ruhr to the U. S. Zone averaged only about 75 per cent of the loadings allocated, principally as a result of the conditions outlined above.

Receipts, however, do not always equal shipments, for a considerable amount of coal is lost by theft enroute. Diversion of coal in transit from the Ruhr is reported to be approximately ten per cent in the case of military shipments, and even higher in the case of shipments for German civilian use. Since no advance notice of the markings of the arriving cars is given, but only the number of cars making up the train, very often entire cars disappear after the train is split up. Although attempts are made to locate the missing cars, frequently no trace of them can be found. In addition, pilfering from cars during train halts often results in the arrival of a half or quarter-filled car.

To summarize, the coal problem — which must be solved if Military Government is to succeed — consists of several interlocking problems which must be tackled before the larger problem can be resolved. The key problem is transport, for increasing production of coal will mean little if the transportation system cannot effect increased distribution.

The entire situation is far too complex to permit any generalization as to when the problem will be solved. All four occupying powers are, however, fully cognizant of the extreme importance of coal to the European economy, and every effort is being made to achieve maximum results.

Occupation Troops and YOUTH ACTIVITIES

Several weeks ago the Western Military District issued an order to its tactical units directing that they take initiative in organizing youth activities.

The effects of this directive promise to be remarkable, and, if it is carried out by tactical units with vigor and enthusiasm, will have far-reaching effects not only on the Germans but on the occupation troops as well. It is perfectly clear that there are not enough blameless nationals left in the country on which to base a youth movement (as opposed to local youth activities), which is specifically forbidden by the Control Council. A few German leaders can be found, but on the whole the result of attempting to organize large-scale youth activities around German leaders would be rather inadequate and aseptic now, particularly in view of the fact that the leaders of youth during the past twelve years have been thoroughly discredited.

DEMOCRACY BY DEMONSTRATION

Among American soldiers, however, there are hundreds of thousands of leaders of youth. With soldiers as youth leaders, the Germans can learn what American sportsmanship is, and why we think and act as we do; that we are not as superficial as so many Continentals seem to think, but that our kind of training and living has produced something which is called American democracy — a commodity which cannot be sold to the Germans in any other way except demonstration. One of the most effective means of achieving international amity and understanding in the past has been through the medium of sports and other similar mutual activities.

One trouble with the relations between the American occupation troops

Western Military District has directed occupation troops to take the initiative in youth activities.

and Europe has been that comparatively little binds us to either the liberated areas or to Germany, except the big picture which is the reason for our being here. Since few of us are able to reflect the ideals of the big picture in our daily lives, fraternization as we have known it has taught the Germans little about Americans, except that we tend to be easy-going and lonely. Youth activities, on the other hand, can be a means of guided fraternization, in which our soldiers can feel a sense of personal responsibility, which is latent now; and they may also come to realize that their real task here is concretely expressed in such an activity as the guidance of youth, in that it is by no means limited merely to the comparatively dull business of serving as security for Military Government.

BENEFITS TO ALL

By such a project, the Germans, of course, benefit the most, in that they receive ready-made leaders for their youth. Out of the first generation of youth who will have had contact with American soldiers may well emerge the new leaders of youth — indoctrinated by our own troops, and prepared to take over the task of instructing and guiding the next generation.

Military Government also benefits, not only because it is assisted in the solution of one of its major problems, but also because the activity of the tactical troops may create a stronger bond between the two phases of the occupation, namely, control and security.

Youth movements in Germany have, in the past, been a part of the national life — far more closely identified with it than in Great Britain and the United States, where the Boy Scouts and similar movements have had a comparatively limited following, with a personal rather than a national appeal. And it has been possible here to gauge the morale of the people by the state of the youth. For example, during the Weimar Republic wandering youth went all over Germany — the "Wandervögel", with no other aim than to keep moving — and out of this unorganized group the nazis were able to mold one of their most powerful instruments for control by the State: the Hitlerjugend.

ARRESTING THE CYCLE

Once again we find in Germany the beginnings of this cycle; the from city to city. One way of arresting this cycle is to take the initiative into our own hands, by anticipating the dangers of a new Hitlerjugend in years to come, simply by organizing the youth locally ourselves, and making them over as our own.

The American press is now accusing the occupation troops of being "taken in" ideologically. Whether this is so or not, there can be no question that by taking such a step as the Seventh Army directive outlines we are definitely taking the ideological initiative in making the youth over as we wish them to be.

The jump from fraternization with children through gifts of gum and candy bars (a method of political indoctrination which probably has not resulted in any lasting effects once the gifts have been consumed) to active supervision of youth activities is a long one. But where it has been tried, as a result of the Seventh Army directive, it has proved to be fairly simple. For

example, U. S. troops are making baseball and football equipment available to German youths in many localities, such as Witzenhausen in Great Hesse, and Pforzheim in North Württemberg-Baden, where a group of soldiers, without prompting from above, has gathered around them boys of the fifteen-years-old group and are now teaching them our sports. Throughout North Württemberg-Baden, military units have been co-operating with civilian authorities to provide educational programs for German children. The 100th Division has designated four officers to co-operate with the Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart in the establishment of such a program, while in Wesermünde (Bremen Sub-District) youth leaders have been appointed in all communities to carry out, in conjunction with local troops, a program of sports, work projects, and handicraft classes for children.

"Ike" Stadium in Bremen was made available to German children for a kite contest and sports festival on October 21st, sponsored by the 115th Infantry and Military Government and having the cooperation of the Office of Sport and Youth Activities of Bremen. About 1500 children, aged ten to fourteen, attended the morning program of sports. The afternoon program, attended by 12,000 persons, was highlighted by a soccer game between players drawn from Bremen sports clubs and a team of Scottish military personnel from Oldenburg (the Germans won, 3-2).

WHAT THE GERMANS ARE DOING

Once official permission had been given for the re-establishment of German youth activities and organizations (subject to Military Government supervision) the German authorities themselves, recognizing the urgent need for it, began everywhere to rebuild the

shattered framework of youth activities at local levels. Many Kreise have already set up youth committees, and a wide variety of youth organizations have been submitted to Military Government for approval. Several groups have actually been approved, and are already active. Non-military sports, literature, art, dramatics, handicrafts, and music seem to be stressed as major activities. Many churches have appointed their outstanding laymen as co-ordinators of secular and church programs of youth activities, and have infused, in some instances, a degree of religious education. Wholly church-sponsored organizations in general seem to be patterned on the model of the Boy Scouts.

UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES

In some localities youth activities have assumed rather unusual forms, in an endeavor to combine leisure-time activities with useful work on the part of the children. This was particularly true before the opening of elementary schools. For instance, the Senator of Education in Bremen has been supervising for several months a project which employs children aged twelve to sixteen in clearing and repairing public gardens, parks, and schools. Working four hours daily before the schools opened, the children were able to restore several school buildings. In Heppenheim (Great Hesse), three or four children were assigned to work with each carpenter, bricklayer, glazier, etc., to do menial work so that the craftsman could devote his time to work that required his particular skill. In Offenbach, 238 youths voluntarily helped to restore schoolrooms, collect medicinal plants, and pick potato bugs in the field. Similarly, in Munich,

hundreds of children gathered herbs in order to help restock the depleted shelves with such items as camomile, peppermint, and herb roots used in preparation of cough remedies and sedatives.

YOUTH'S NEED FOR GUIDANCE

In the years of national socialism, the many activities of the party, and to a lesser extent churches and other religious organizations, took up the leisure time of Germany's children. Nazi youth organizations have been stopped, and religious communities have found little time to tackle the growing problem of youth welfare and leisure-time activities. The havoc wrought in German economic and social standards, the cumulative effects of bombing, lack of toys and books, and the necessary though regrettable temporary lapse in formal schooling, have all contributed in leaving their mark on German youth, now not only disillusioned but from their point of view with every reason to feel desperate for the future. Without America's personal touch, the youth of this country find it hard to believe in a wholly new concept of democracy; the benefits of it are not readily apparent to them.

The German authorities, now permitted to organize local youth activity, recognize the seriousness of the dilemma of youth. The older generations in this country are finding it hard to retain the respect of their disenchanted young. For the sake of the future of our efforts to bring democracy to Germany as well as the future of youth, co-operation in guiding youth by democracy's best salesmen, the American soldier, will go a long way toward contributing to the establishment of a future Europe, genuinely at peace.

Personnel QUALIFICATIONS for CIVILIAN Jobs

Personnel qualifications for civilian jobs at Regional level of Military Government are described in these briefs. Qualifications for additional posts open to Military Government personnel will be published in forthcoming issues of the BULLETIN.

HEAD OF FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY - CAF 14

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 8,969)

Must have had broad experience and academic training in agricultural management, including production, harvesting, processing and distribution. Must be familiar with German agricultural history and understand the operation of pre-war cooperative organizations, knowledge of subsistence, floors and ceilings in neighboring countries desirable.

Must be familiar with German forestry system and have broad general knowledge of Forestry management.

Must be able to achieve coordination with other Government heads on agricultural problems concerning, manpower, transportation, finance, etc.

Graduation from an approved agricultural college or university essential.

* *

HEAD OF AGRICULTURAL SECTION - CAF 13

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 7,787)

Must have demonstrated capacity for technical and administrative supervision over farms and market channels to insure regulated flow of products to customers. Must be able to direct German agricultural authorities in the use of lands, production goals, distribution methods, and shifting of emphasis on

one crop to another to further Allied interests. Must be able to familiarize himself with German system of agricultural control through detailed accounting system for capacity, production, and sales from farm lands.

(Staff members and staff assistants positions at CAF Grade 11 and 9, gross salaries 5,375 dollars and 4,550 dollars respectively are available in this category).

* *

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 7,787)

Must have detailed knowledge of processing and distribution of food to customers, must be familiar with categories of customers, such as laborers, unemployed, victims of nazi persecution, etc., and know Allied policy with relation to each. Knows principles of supervision over wholesalers, cooperatives, retailers and German food offices.

(Staff members and staff assistants positions at CAF Grades 11 & 9, gross salaries 5,375 dollars and 4,550 dollars respectively are available in this category).

* *

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE AND/OR FORESTRY SPECIALIST - CAF 7

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 3,725)

General training and some experience in either food, agriculture or forestry fields. Must have demonstrated capacity for defining irregular or inefficient

plant, shop or farm operation. Will be required to maintain charts and records, and write routine reports. Must have had some office management experience.

* *

HEAD OF POSTS, TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH FUNCTION - CAF 14

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 8,969)

Broad knowledge of German Postal services and Wire Communications essential. Must be able to supervise the reconstruction of these services on regional level. Postal Services also involving some old age and pension schemes, savings banks with attending check clearance problems, directs that this individual must also know in a general way these services.

Must have knowledge of general engineering practices and be familiar with rehabilitation operation and maintenance of communication equipment. Must have extensive executive experience in handling communication systems, engineering problems and postal functions. Use of German language desirable.

* *

HEAD OF TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SECTION - CAF 13

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 7,787)

Must have demonstrated capacity to organize and control communications systems, to formulate, publish, and enforce policy governing restoration of these facilities; must be able to make spot checks and investigations of administrative and technical functionings of same to ascertain inefficiency and insure security.

* *

HEAD OF POSTS SECTION - CAF 13

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 7,787)

Must have thorough knowledge of postal facilities and services, be capable of the formulation, publication and enforcement of policies governing restora-

tion of minimum essential services. Must be so thoroughly familiar with this service that he can detect any evasion or inefficiency on part of German administration at any level in his region.

* *

POSTS, TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH (STAFF MEMBERS) - CAF 11

(Base Salary Plus Overseas - \$ 5,375)

Individuals must have general overall experience and/or training in communications or postal work. Requirements are similar to those of heads of same sections, and individuals will be performing essentially the same kind of work as section heads with a lesser degree of responsibility.

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Black-Market Transport

CIVIL ROAD Transport is being used for unauthorized movements and to haul black-market commodities. Military Districts were directed this week to take immediate steps to strengthen all present Civil Police Motorcycle Roads Patrols and to establish additional road patrols where deemed necessary to curtail these violations. Night spot checks and patrolling of secondary and back roads are to be emphasized.

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Book-Burnings Not Authorized

DURING the week USFET's attention was called to rumors that certain Landräte and German communities have been instructed to collect books with nazi tendencies with a view to their destruction, together with others called from Public Libraries and stores, by means of public bonfires and otherwise. Destruction of seized books and other literature is not authorized, and the Military Districts were directed to take steps to prevent such action.



THE *German Press*

THE EXTRACT from a Military Government detachment report given below aptly sums up the attitude of the German population toward the recently-licensed newspapers:

After analyzing the hundreds of rumors and interviewing Germans of all walks of life, one is led to the conclusion that the German independent press exercises no influence at all over the German people. Not all the newspapers appearing in the region are of equal quality. The Frankfurter Rundschau is by far the best, with the Rhein-Neckar Zeitung occupying second place. But even these fail in their efforts to simulate an alive newspaper.

Even assuming that news of an international scope is not of prime importance in a newspaper, the German newspaper in the American Zone is deficient also in the coverage of local news. The reader feels as if a foreigner, writing flawless German, is preaching to him. Several members of the staffs of different newspapers admit that newspaper work is something new to them, and that the concentration camp was no school of journalism. This lack of expertness they remand to second place, however, and according to them the main reasons for the colorlessness of the press are the timidity of the licensees, the divergent political views represented by them and the jealousy among the different political parties present on the staff concerning publicity given to one or the other of the parties. Among the deficiencies to which they confess are:

The Germans survey the weaknesses of their new Press.

- 1) The lack of agricultural coverage. The farmer and the farm areas remain almost neglected except in items concerning black marketing or the food supply.
- 2) The lack of youth coverage. No attempt has been made by any newspaper to enlist the younger generation among its readers by offering special columns to their problems.
3. The failure to help readjust the people to the new forms of government.

All the newspapers complain about the shortages of paper and print and trained personnel. They ascribe their lack of influence also to the fact that there are no independent news agencies and to the shortage of "names" known to the people.

Among the many shattered illusions once held by the German people is the one concerning the sanctity of the press. The German, having been fooled by the press under Hitler, has now lost all faith in it. Hence he pays little attention to the printed news items, dismissing them either as propaganda, or at best only attempting to find in them support for the rumors he has heard. The prevalence of rumors is the best indication of the ineffectiveness of the press. The reader does not expect important news from the newspapers.

For that he turns to the rumor mongers, who are always prepared to describe the latest "skirmish" among the Allies.

The German regards the newspapers as the moutpieces of the occupying forces. The sanctimonious tone which most of the papers assume when discussing Allied war aims and the operations of Military Government are not conducive to another point of view. Even the average anti-nazi German, though fully aware of Germany's war guilt, considers it in bad taste for the editorial staffs to continue day after day to relate the nation's sins. Though the great majority of the population advocates co-operation with the occupying forces, the currying of favors by anticipating the desires of the governors is held in contempt by all. And that is what the German accuses the press of doing.

The Necessity for Law No. 8

THE PAINED surprise accorded by a multitude of Germans on the publication of Law No. 8, and the loud and resentful wailings that followed the first shock, clearly indicate both that the Germans finally realize that our denazification gun had, so to speak, a real bullet in it, and that this law was necessary to make them realize the fact. In a recent issue of the Wiesbadener Kurier, a German himself, it is encouraging to note, takes his non-nazi fellow-countrymen to task for not showing an earlier will to effect themselves an adequate housecleaning of nazis in business and industrial enterprises. His remarks, published under the title, "Our Lesson (Uns zur Lehre)," are translated below.

"Several months ago, when the war was approaching its end, all anti-fascist circles were clear as to the necessity for

wiping out national socialism. Quite a lot happened in this regard, too, above all in the field of civil administration. Within business and industry, however, things developed only in a very unsatisfactory manner and the dissatisfaction released thereby had to have its consequences — which are now with us. They are expressed in Law 8 which is now being busily and anxiously discussed from all angles.

"That there had to be such a law at all, to accomplish something that was naturally called for, and that it had to be promulgated by Military Government instead of issuing from a German source, is a bitter lesson for us. The promulgation of the law is like a slap in the face, because it forces us to acknowledge that, quite frankly, we can't properly dispose of a question, whose solution is our own responsibility, either in a timely or technical sense.

"Law No. 8 refers exclusively to the employment of former nazis in business enterprises. It is not concerned with public administration, which matter is handled differently and has progressed much farther. In leading business circles there obviously existed no inclination to co-operate effectively in eliminating nazism. As so often, instead of acting, one assumed an attitude of waiting chiefly, it is presumed, because very many people on business directorates and boards would themselves have been affected by any [anti-nazi] measures. It is our own fault that very drastic measures are now being taken which we could have avoided by timely and effective action. Weren't we able to act in the manner called for ourselves? Didn't our own government neglect to regulate this important problem? By our inaction, haven't we shown that we are lacking in good will, to build something new and really to eliminate nazism from private business, too?

"The application of the law requires

for complete effectiveness its execution in all zones of occupation. What use the local Military Government authorities will make of the exception clause in Paragraph 5 remains to be seen. The text gives a clue as to the method of handling exceptions. Those persons who assert that they did not actively participate in the affairs of the NSDAP or its affiliated organizations can submit an appeal. It will take months to process the thousands of such appeals. Until then Paragraph 1 will be effective, whereby the employment of any persons referred to is forbidden,

except in the capacity of an ordinary worker.

"The terms of this law mean without doubt a severe economic shock for many people. But it is both useless and too late to bewail that fact. One should have reflected earlier on that, namely, when one joined the party!

"The present severities of the law could have without doubt been avoided, if we ourselves had taken full and timely action. Let us solve our own problems! That was our duty! We neglected it. May we learn from this lesson!"



Housing OF DISPLACED PERSONS

IN LINE with the policy of placing administrative as well as material responsibility for the care of Displaced Persons on the German civil authorities, Detachment E-4 (Kassel) has directed the Regierungsdirektor of the building department to take charge of the winterization of camps throughout the Regierungsbezirk. Full responsibility for the acquisition of materials, the employment of labor, and the supervision of the work has been delegated to this official and his office. *

In a directive dated October 20th the Regierungsdirektor was instructed to make all preliminary surveys and to submit to the Housing Officer of Detachment E-4 a list of materials required, so that Military Government may expedite the allocation of the necessary items. The surveys, which have now been completed, were to be made in co-operation with UNRRA camp directors and local Military Government Detachments. Standards to which buildings must be brought were set by the camp directors in conference with local detachments and the civilian contractors. Following approval of the list of items by the Housing Officer of Detachment E-4, allocations, where available, were made by the civilian allocation authorities.

In the case of some materials, however, supplies did not exist in Regierungsbezirk Kassel. The Trade and Industry Section of Detachment E-4 had to be called in to manufacture material available in other areas. In this manner tar was allocated to a tarpaper plant as well as coal for its operation.

How Kassel's Co-ordinating Board (described last week) lines up with the policy of making the Germans take over functional responsibility from Military Government.

An allocation of glass was also obtained, and Transportation is supervising the shipment of this critical item. There is also a shortage of stove pipe, which may be obtained in the British area or may possibly be manufactured in the Regierungsbezirk.

Since first priority has been given to this work, the allocation of scarce building-trades labor has solved what might have become a serious problem. The lack of such skilled workers has hampered repair of civilian housing throughout the area, but the work on the DP camps has progressed satisfactorily.

A check on progress is constantly made by UNRRA and by the local detachments. Any additional problems of supply, labor, or transportation are discussed at the weekly meetings of the Displaced Persons Co-ordinating Board, the weekly MGO's meeting, and the weekly UNRRA meeting (as analyzed in the last issue of the BULLETIN).

The fact that the deadline set (the middle of November) will, according to present indications, be met, points to the success of this method of accomplishing the repairs. A saving in manpower, by utilization of German technical knowledge in the surveying of needs and the supervision of actual work (rather than by attempting to use the limited tech-

nical skill of UNRRA camp directors and local military government detachments), has been achieved. Through the centralization of supply and control, a single requisition can be submitted for the Regierungsbezirk and all supply planning can be done for the area as a unit rather than having a complicated scramble for materials at the Landkreis level. With responsibility firmly placed with one man (or agency), efficiency is increased.

It is hoped that the anticipated success of this project will permit this type of administrative co-ordination to be used for other purposes in line with the general policy of placing responsibility at an increasingly higher level.

CIVIL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ALLOCATION

The civilian head of trade and industry in LK Naila (RB Ober- und Mittelfranken) asked the assistance of Military Government in combatting what he considers to be a detrimental policy on the part of the Regional Economic Office, which has been issuing ration slips for large amounts of shoes, textiles, and other items produced in the Landkreis for distribution to other regions. He pointed out that the Munich office has made no provision for procurement of raw materials for continued production, and that at the present required rate of production many plants will have to shut down in the next few months. Military Government informed the Landrat that under current policy all such questions should be taken up with the German agencies concerned, on whom responsibility for civilian problems of production and distribution have been placed.

LABOR UNIONS IN KASSEL

During the past month there has been a marked increase in labor union activity in RB Kassel. Seventy-seven applications for Shop-Steward elections were received during the past week alone.

There has been, in the past, a general apathy toward labor-union participation not unlike the attitude toward politics. At a local manpower conference held last month, it was stated that the trade-union movement must find its roots at the lowest levels, primarily in Shop-Steward elections. This expressed policy has apparently generated the sudden upswing in activity.

Presented with the thesis that they must base the justification for their unions on the participation of the workers, rather than on the formation merely of the machinery for union activity, the trade-union organizers (mostly former Social Democrats and pre-Hitler trade-unionists) have concentrated their attention on the stimulation of Shop-Steward elections. The growth of this activity closely parallels development of politics, in that interest in trade unions has been prompted by organizers rather than activity on the part of the workers themselves, who have shown no apparent reawakening of long-dormant enthusiasm for this type of organization.

The movement received further impetus when Military Government directives were publicized through the facilities of the local German paper and by means of posters prominently displayed throughout the Regierungsbezirk.



Eisenhower Report

IN NEWS SPOTLIGHT

THE THIRD monthly report of General Eisenhower as Military Governor was prominently featured in the American press, with commentators stressing the economic, social and political problems facing the occupation forces in Germany. Some observers saw the report as reinforcing General Marshall's recent warning that the nation is demobilizing its wartime armies too fast.

The report of General Eisenhower "paints a frankly unsatisfactory and in part disturbing picture of the situation," declared The New York Times. "Political and economic conditions in Germany are deteriorating rapidly beyond the state caused by the war and the German collapse. The food and fuel situation is growing worse as winter approaches . . . If this involved only the fate of the Germans themselves, many might be inclined to shrug their shoulders and let it go at that. But the developing conditions also affect our occupation troops. No doubt the influence of Nazi ideas and the fraternization of Allied soldiers with German women have something to do with this. But the main cause is hunger and misery."

The statement that German unrest might possibly lead to organized resistance evoked many editorial comments. Said the New York Herald-Tribune: "The question which Americans must face is whether these symptoms of a potential German rebellion are the inevitable result of German unwillingness to accept the consequences of defeat, or whether they stem spontaneously and gratuitously from errors of Allied administration and

Allied policies. In the first case, the occupation forces can only brace themselves for conflict; the Germans cannot be permitted to alter the terms of their sentence by force or the threat of force. If the second is a true statement of the situation, something must be done if tragedy is to be avoided."

The disclosure that "German arrogance is once again on the rise and that signs of organized uprising are everywhere present comes as a sickening shock to the American people, who at such staggering cost brought about the destruction of the Nazi armies," said the Cleveland Plain Dealer, adding that if General Eisenhower needs more soldiers, "he should have them without quibbling." In similar vein, the Boston Post asserted that the American people could have but one reaction to the revelation that German youth and former soldiers are developing a spirit of resistance. "That reaction will be that, if not enough force is being applied to keep the Germans completely subject to the American Administrative Regulations, more force should be directed against the revolters," the Post said.

In an editorial on November 4th, entitled "Are We Failing in Germany?" the Philadelphia Record declared that "we are stripping our occupation forces in Germany so fast, to comply with the demands 'to bring the boys home', that the original program for the occupation of Germany suffers," asserting that General Eisenhower must be given all the men, materials and authority he needs. "The alternative would be to court disaster, for the second time in

less than 30 years," the Record warned.

As one radio commentator, John Kennedy saw it, General Marshall's warning that we are in a dangerous hurry to return to the ways of peace received a powerful reinforcement in General Eisenhower's report. Said Kennedy: "Eisenhower reports mounting dissatisfaction among the Germans, especially resentment among young Germans over fraternization among American troops with German girls. Such resentment is quite understandable. For not only young German men, but young American women don't like that fraternization at all."

Post-Hitler Germany interprets American friendliness as "downright foolishness" and habitual American kindness "merely as proofs of weakness", asserted John Vandercook in an NBC broadcast. "A race trained to idolize a sternly-disciplined army has only arrogant superiority as it observes the casual lack of discipline of U.S. occupation troops; so these supermen, again falsely assured of their own superiority, are beginning to make real trouble," said Vandercook.

Navy Day Speech

President Truman's Navy Day speech was received with generally favorable comment by the American press as providing a clear-cut definition of U.S. foreign policy in the post-war world. The Washington Post expressed the opinion that the President was right in assuming that the program outlined in the speech is "the foreign policy favored by a great majority of the people," pointing out, however, that its principal weakness was vagueness as to plans for putting this policy into effect.

In the opinion of The New York Times, the President has answered "both those who have been crying that we have no foreign policy and those

who viewed our principles as camouflage for ulterior motives. And in so doing he has laid the basis for a new start toward making peace."

Sounding a more critical note, the New York Herald-Tribune declared that "among America's neighbors, there is likely to be more alarm at the fact of American power — so triumphantly proclaimed by the President — than confidence in the promise that it will be devoted only to the most beneficent ends. Mr. Truman's picture of power united with idealism is an inspiring one, but such inspiration can become a most dangerous intoxicant."

Though the President's speech was favorably received in England, sharp exception was taken by most commentators to the decision of the Washington administration to retain the secret of the atomic bomb.

A typical comment on this point was the following from the Manchester Guardian: "We in this country, with our peculiar ties and the practical certainty that we shall never be enemies, may be ready to take American altruism at something near its face value. But the rest of the world, and especially the suspicious, secretive Russians, may not. In his handling of the question of the atomic bomb . . . President Truman, it must be feared, has not increased the area of international trustfulness. If the United States asserts high principles of 'world co-operation', she must be prepared to apply them; she will be bitterly disillusioned, if she thinks that the way to 'outlaw' the atomic bomb is to sit on it."

For Britain and Europe, the most important part of the President's speech, said the London Sunday Times, "is that in which he reaffirmed the determination of his Government to remain in the United Nations organization and to share the responsibility of ensuring peace — by force, if necessary."

East of the Elbe

In an article entitled "East of the Elbe", the London Economist, in a recent issue, makes some interesting observations with respect to developments in the Soviet Zone. Following the earlier period of "destructive revengefulness", the article states that the Soviet Military Government "is getting down to brass tacks and trying to rehabilitate what is left of Eastern Germany." The article describes the attention which is being paid to the "intelligentsia" through the opening of theaters, concerts, and the publication of newspapers, and the organization of political parties. Despite this program, according to the article, "Russian policy has not secured its objective — it has not made up of Eastern Germany a genuine sphere of Russian influence."

Russian policy, it pointed out, is still confronted by the dilemma of balancing the desire for revenge with the need for reconciliation. "Whatever the duration and the further policies of the Russian occupation, it has already impressed itself on Germany's social structure to an extent that cannot easily be ignored even beyond the Russian Zone," the Economist said.

Soviet and French Reaction

Moscow broadcasts were featured by an attack on foreign papers that are critical of the operation of the reparations decisions at Potsdam. "The Berlin decision calls for the liquidation of German war industry, not of those industries catering for German civilian requirements," declared Hoffman in an English broadcast, which charged that certain newspapers were trying to give the public a distorted understanding of the Allied reparations plans.

Soviet broadcasts continued to oppose leniency to the nazis and urge the need

for watchfulness to safeguard the peace against possible future aggressor nations.

The decision of U.S. military authorities to stop the transfer of German prisoners to France was prominently featured in the French press, with the trend of comment not unfavorable to the American action.

Reflecting French opinion on the German problem, Pierre Bernus in Le Nation declared that France was rendering a service to the world in opposing policies that might lead to the unification of Germany.

Random Comments

"Actually the German mind is so accustomed to goose-stepping that it is doubtful if a generation of education would inculcate in them the principles of democracy as we understand them. That task of re-education and of disarming minds accustomed to thinking in militaristic terms and to giving blind obedience to leaders who appeal to the underlying selfishness and stupidity of the German soul is perhaps the greatest one that lies before us in conquered Germany, and, quite frankly, it is being neglected." Raymond Daniell in The New York Times.

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"Military Government works better than I had expected, for many of its officials have a genuine and valuable sense of mission. You find a man in his twenties governing a decent-sized town with all the assurance of an administrator of long standing. And no colonial governor had a greater variety of problems to settle than those which faced Military Government in the early days . . . But in the absence of a long-term policy for Germany, Military Government is doing a job which should both lessen the dangers of chaos now

and increase the chances of educating anew generation of Germans." **Vernon Bartlett in the London News Chronicle.**

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"The other evening I finished reading Henry Morgenthau Jr.'s book 'Germany is our Problem.' The facts in this book are carefully checked. It is not written with any hate of the German people, but with the purpose of making it clear to us that this land which lies in the center of Europe will not be allowed to start another war. I think it is the best answer to some of the industrialists, both in Great Britain and here, who think more of their pockets than they do of world safety." **Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt in "My Day".**

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"From the point of view of the European economy, if for no other reason, the deindustrialization scheme for Germany advocated by Mr. Morgenthau would have disastrous consequences. In the long run, Germany's economic position in Europe cannot be glossed over. Conversion of Germany's industry, from war to peace production, must therefore have as its objective the reintegration of Germany into the European and world economy. Naturally, Germany's extreme nationalism must be purged and democracy firmly established. But neither of these goals can be attained if the German people are deprived of their livelihood." **Heinz Eulau in the New Republic.**

* *

"If the people of the world need reminding of the scope and horror of the nazi regime's record, the indictment drawn up jointly by the Four Powers will prove a compressed but convincing

reminder . . . But the indictment raises one or two questions, nevertheless. Is it not a most inadequate and superficial reading of history to dismiss the unparalleled upheaval of the German revolution as simply a 'conspiracy', the plot of a few wicked men? An indictment, naturally, cannot delve into the deep causes of history any more than a murder charge can detail the bad environment, broken homes, or inherited weaknesses that helped to condition the criminal. But it would be fatal if the German disaster were generally written off as 'a conspiracy' and no account taken of the world conditions of international anarchy and economic depression which were the background of Hitler's rise to power." **The London Economist.**

* *

"Not often has armed invasion brought liberty to the majority of people in the invaded country . . . What is going on in Germany today, which includes the imposition of a new 'Bill of Rights' upon that conquered nation, seems unique . . . A similar process is going on in Japan, where an army of occupation is compelling the Japanese Government to permit freedom of speech, to democratize its schools and to liberalize its constitution. Neither in Germany nor Japan are we doing such things for sentimental reasons . . . We do not fear attack from any nation in which the basic freedoms are respected. Therefore, we are doing what we can to secure respect for those freedoms in the nations which attacked us. Forcing freedom on those who didn't ask for it is a final act of war. If our recent enemies are ultimately the happier for it, we cannot help it." **Editorial in the New York Times.**

Station List

Military Government Elements

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
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UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

Office of Mil Govt for Germany (U.S.) Berlin			Lt Gen Lucius D Clay
Office of Mil Govt (U.S. Zone) Frankfurt			Maj Gen C L Adcock

WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT Seventh U.S. Army

Office of Mil Govt (Western District)	Heidelberg	Western Military District 2d Mil Govt Regiment (APO 758)	Col M O Edwards
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Hq 2d Mil Govt Regt	Bad Homburg		Lt Col N F Hines
Hq Co	Bad Homburg		1st Lt A W Huck
Sv Co	Ober Ursel		1st Lt R. A. Madden
1st Maint Plat	Zuffenhausen		1st Lt E Thompson
2d Maint Plat	Wetzlar		Capt T Candon
2d MG Med Det	Heidelberg		Lt Col W H Riheldaffer

NORTH WÜRTTEMBERG-BADEN.

E-1	Stuttgart	North Württemberg- Baden	Col W W Dawson
Württemberg			
Co A	Stuttgart		Capt O Martin
E-1	Stuttgart	Württemberg	Col W W Dawson
F-10	Stuttgart	SK Stuttgart	Lt Col C L Jackson
F-11	Ulm	SK-LK Ulm	Lt Col I. L. Harlow
G-20	Aalen	LK Aalen	Maj J K Owen
G-21	Böblingen	LK Böblingen	Capt W A Becker
G-22	Crailsheim	LK Crailsheim	Lt Col R L Rogers
G-23	Esslingen	LK Esslingen	Lt Col J I Taylor
G-24	Gmünd	LK Gmünd	Capt J N Krajnak
G-25	Göppingen	LK Göppingen	Maj G W Ford
G-26	Schwabisch Hall	LK Hall	Maj W T Neel
G-27	Heidenheim	LK Heidenheim	Maj B V Bloom
G-28	Heilbronn	LK Heilbronn	Lt Col H M Montgomery
G-29	Ludwigsburg	LK Ludwigsburg	Capt H K Manson
G-30	Waiblingen	LK Waiblingen	Maj H W Freeman
H-50	Backnang	LK Backnang	Maj G D Burchell
H-51	Heilbronn	SK Heilbronn	Maj M L Hoover
H-52	Künzelsau	LK Künzelsau	Capt W L Straus
H-53	Leonberg	LK Leonberg	Capt R S Dotts
H-54	Bad Mergentheim	LK Mergentheim	Capt S L Haber
H-55	Nürtingen	LK Nürtingen	Maj S A Warren
H-56	Ohringen	LK Ohringen	1st Lt M Korson
H-57	Ulm	Warehouse Opn	Lt Col J M Gregory
H-58	Vaihingen	LK Vaihingen	Capt J G Cox

Landesbezirk North Baden

Co E	Durlach	Landesbezirk	1st Lt R T Lynch
E-7	Karlsruhe	North Baden	Col C Lisle
F-16	Mannheim	SK Mannheim	Lt Col R S Smith
G-42	Weinheim	LK Mannheim	Maj B C Barnes
G-43	Heidelberg	SK Heidelberg	Lt Col G P Kratz
G-44	Heidelberg	LK Heidelberg	Capt H D Peterson
G-45	Ettlingen	LK Karlsruhe	1st Lt W C Hagen Jr.
G-46	Pforzheim	SK-LK Pforzheim	1st Lt N. Semaschko

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
G-47	Karlsruhe	SK Karlsruhe	Maj M S Pullen
H-87	Bruchsal	LK Bruchsal	Capt O L Hayes
H-88	Foundenheim	Warehouse Opn	Maj H E Kring
H-89	Buchen	LK Buchen	Maj J A McGuinness
H-90	Mosbach	LK Mosbach	Maj N O Moore
H-91	Tauberbischofsheim	LK Tauberbischofsheim	Capt J F Moyer
H-92	Sinsheim	LK Sinsheim	Capt G O Withey
I-137	Edingen	Warehouse Opn	Capt R L Shadwick

LAND GREAT HESSE

E-6 Wiesbaden Land Great Hesse Col J R Newman

Regierungsbezirk Wiesbaden

Co D	Weilburg		Capt J L Savannah
E-6	Wiesbaden	RB Wiesbaden	Col J R Newman
E-6	Frankfurt	SK Frankfurt	Lt Col R K Phelps
F-15	Wiesbaden	SK Wiesbaden	Lt Col F A Samson
G-41	Wetzlar	LK Wetzlar	Lt Col E M Lee
H-77	Dillenburg	LK Dillkreis & LK Biedenkopf	Maj D B Bernstein
H-78	Gelnhausen	LK Gelnhausen & LK Schlüchtern	Maj M E Chotas
H-79	Hanau	SK-LK Hanau	Maj T Turner Jr
H-80	Limburg	LK Limburg & LK Oberlahnkreis	Capt E F Duffy
H-83	Rüdesheim	LK Rheingaukreis & LK Untertaunuskreis	Maj J G Gavin
H-86	Bad Homburg	LK Obertaunuskreis & LK Usingen & LK Maintaunuskreis	Capt A L Yakoubian

Regierungsbezirk Kassel

Co C	Kirchhain		1st Lt J F Owen
E-4	Kassel	RB Kassel	Lt Col A Skarry
F-14	Kassel	SK-LK Kassel & LK Wolfhagen	Maj R Bard
G-38	Fritzlar	LK Fritzlar-Homberg & LK Ziegenhain	Maj R A Gish
G-39	Marburg	SK-LK Marburg	Lt Col T A Brown
G-40	Fulda	SK-LK Fulda & LK Hünfeld	Maj E J Dikeman
G-48	Korbach	LK Waldeck & LK Frankenberg	Maj J R Chambliss
H-66	Eschwege	LK Eschwege	Capt A W Moore
H-67	Hersfeld	LK Hersfeld	Capt G S Fredell
H-68	Hofgeismar	LK Hofgeismar	Capt S C Moore Jr.
H-70	Melsungen	LK Melsungen & LK Rotenburg	Maj T T Turnbull Jr.
H-72	Kassel	Warehouse Opn	Capt J R Newell
H-73	Witzenhausen	LK Witzenhausen	Capt W E Getman
ML-1 (Sa)	Kassel	Liaison	Maj F C Eggers

Regierungsbezirk Hessen

Co B	Darmstadt		1st Lt A L Husted Jr.
E-3	Darmstadt	RB Hessen	Lt Col W T Burt
F-12	Darmstadt	SK-LK Darmstadt & LK Gross-Gerau	Lt Col L G Kelly
F-13	Offenbach	SK-LK Offenbach	Lt Col W A Snow
G-31	Bensheim	LK Bergstrasse & LK Erbach	Maj A C Leggatt
G-32	Büdingen	LK Büdingen	Maj L S LaPrade
G-33	Dieburg	LK Dieburg	Maj E T Cusiek
G-34	Friedberg	LK Friedberg	Maj R J Willard
G-35	Giessen	SK-LK Giessen	Capt J S Chaplin
H-62	Lauterbach	LK Lauterbach & LK Alsfeld	Capt H Nickelsberg

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
BREMEN SUB-DISTRICT			
E2C2	Bremen	Bremen Sub-District	Lt Col B C Welker
G1C2	Wesermünde	SK-LK Wesermünde	Lt Col L S Diggs
H4C2	Osterholz-Scharmbeck	LK Osterholz	Lt Col J R Reed
I11C2	Brake	LK Wesermarsch	Capt M L Krauss
I12C2	Nordenham	GM Nordenham	Capt G R Zeek

EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
Thlrđ U.S. Army

Office of Mil Govt for Bavaria Munich	Eastern Military District	Brig Gen W. J. Muller
	3d Mil Govt Regt (APO 403)	
Hq 3d Mil Govt Regt Augsburg		Maj F W Sutton
Hq Co Augsburg		Capt Wm Irwin
Sv Co Augsburg		Capt J O'Malley
1st Maint Plat Augsburg		Capt J O'Malley
2d Maint Plat Uttenreuth		1st Lt C Casper
3d Maint Plat Straubing		1st Lt C. T. Enbody
R & T Co Augsburg		Capt T J May
3d MG Med Det Munich		Lt Col C Shields
3d MG Med Sec Augsburg		Capt H S Price

BAVARIA		
Office of Munich	Bavaria	Brig Gen W. J. Muller
Mil Govt for Bavaria		

Regierungsbezirk Mainfranken

Co A Ochsenfurt	RB Mainfranken	1st Lt H A Lenert
E-202 Würzburg	SK-LK Würzburg	Lt Col M E Henderson
F-210 Würzburg	SK-LK Aschaffenburg	Maj J B Bradford
G-220 Aschaffenburg	SK-LK Schweinfurt	Maj C M Emerick
G-221 Schweinfurt	LK Kitzingen	Maj J B Thompson
H-250 Bad Kissingen	LK Kitzingen	Capt M A Potter
H-251 Kitzingen	LK Alzenau	Capt J B Lynn
I-330 Alzenau	LK Brückenau	Maj E E Shovea
I-331 Brückenau	LK Ebern	Capt H B Clark Jr
I-332 Ebern	LK Gemünden	Capt S L Tulin
I-333 Gemünden	LK Gerolzhofen	Capt K N Galloway
I-334 Gerolzhofen	LK Hammelburg	Capt W J Tonkin
I-335 Hammelburg	LK Hassfurt	Capt E H Emery
I-336 Hassfurt	LK Hofheim	Capt T F Griffen
I-337 Hofheim	LK Karlstadt	Capt W Hitt
I-338 Karlstadt	LK Königshofen	1st Lt W E Brayden
I-339 Königshofen	LK Lohr	Capt A W Peterson
I-340 Lohr	LK Marktheidenfeld	Capt Elmer E Kelly
I-341 Marktheidenfeld	LK Mellrichstadt	Capt M B Voorhees
I-342 Mellrichstadt	LK Miltenberg	Capt J. J. Schaller
I-343 Miltenberg	LK Neustadt a. d. Salle	Capt D J Huffman
I-344 Neustadt Salle	LK Obernburg	1st Lt E F Warnke
I-345 Obernburg	LK Ochsenfurt	Capt B H Logan
I-346 Ochsenfurt		Capt H A Storm

Regierungsbezirk Ober & Mittelfranken

Co C Ansbach	RB Ober & Mittelfranken	1st Lt G N Hultzen
E-203 Ansbach	SK-LK Nürnberg	Col E M Haight
F-211 Nürnberg	SK-LK Ansbach	Col C H Andrews
G-228 Ansbach	SK-LK Fürth	Maj W R Whitaker, Jr.
G-229 Fürth	LK Dinkelsbühl	Capt J D Cofer
H-261 Dinkelsbühl	LK Eichstadt	Maj J. W. Hall
H-262 Eichstadt	LK Feuchtwangen	Maj W T Stoats
H-263 Feuchtwangen	LK Gunzenhausen	Capt J M Hodges Jr.
H-264 Gunzenhausen	LK Hersbruck	Maj H W Zurn
H-265 Hersbruck	LK Hilpoltstein	Maj F M Dunbaugh
H-266 Hilpoltstein		Maj H T Lund

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
H-267	Weissenburg	LK Weissenburg	Maj W S Bailey Jr
H-268	Rothenburg	LK Rothenburg	Maj R C Anderson
H-269	Schwabach	LK Schwabach	Maj R E Stringer
H-270	Scheinfeld	LK Scheinfeld	Maj H C Kauffmann
H-271	Windheim	LK Uffenheim	Capt M C Baer
H-272	Lauf	LK Lauf	Capt E N Humphrey
H-273	Neustadt a. d. Aisch	LK Neustadt a. d. Aisch	Maj F K Hinchey
Co B	Bamberg		1st Lt M J Skwarto
G-222	Bamberg	SK-LK Bamberg	Maj J A Watkins
G-223	Bayreuth	SK-LK Bayreuth	Lt Col C J Reilly
G-224	Erlangen	LK Erlangen	Lt Col H Hargrave
G-225	Coburg	SK-LK Coburg	Maj H Lockland
G-226	Kronach	LK Kronach	Maj H I Woodall Jr.
G-227	Hof	SK-LK Hof	Maj A R Giroux
G-247	Lichtenfels	LK Lichtenfels	Maj J R Case
H-252	Ebermannstadt	LK Ebermannstadt	1st Lt J J Bianchi
H-253	Hochstadt	LK Hochstadt a. d. Aisch	Capt R G Hanford
H-254	Kulmbach	LK Kulmbach	Maj P B Lamson
H-255	Pegnitz	LK Pegnitz	Maj M F Skinner
H-256	Münchberg	LK Münchberg	Maj A C Abbott
H-258	Rehau	LK Rehau	Capt R H Dodds
H-259	Wunseidel	LK Wunseidel	Capt D H Alexander
H 260	Forchheim	LK Forchheim	Lt Col F Robie
I-347	Naila	LK Naila	Capt H W Newell
I-348	Stadtsteinach	LK Stadtsteinach	1st Lt H F Casademont

Regierungbezirk Niederbayern & Oberpfalz

Co D	Regensburg		Capt V A Grasso
E-204	Regensburg	RB Niederbayern & Oberpfalz	Lt Col Hasting
F-212	Regensburg	SK-LK Regensburg	Lt Col S S Speaks
G-230	Weiden	SK Weiden & LK Neustadt a. d. Wald	Maj J C Robertson Jr.
G-244	Amberg	SK-LK Amberg	Maj Mattox
H-274	Cham	LK Cham	Maj C E McDaniel
H-275	Burglengenfeld	LK Burglengenfeld	Capt E. Fichter
H-276	Parsberg	LK Parsberg	Maj H J Mrachek
H-277	Tirschenreuth	LK Tirschenreuth	Capt F P Murray
H-278	Neunburg	LK Neunburg vorm Wald	Maj J J Egan
H-279	Eschenbach	LK Eschenbach i. d. Opf.	Capt W R Baylies
I-349	Kemnath	LK Kemnath	Capt W G Montpas
I-350	Nabburg	LK Nabburg	Capt G Doyle
I-351	Oberviechtach	LK Oberviechtach	Capt R A Berry
I-352	Riedenberg	LK Riedenberg	Capt C V Hansen
I-353	Vohenstrauß	LK Vohenstrauß	Capt S Lesneski
I-354	Roding	LK Roding	Capt C R Bucheit
I-355	Waldmünchen	LK Waldmünchen	Capt J E Hudson
I-356	Beilngries	LK Beilngries	Capt J J Mallon
I-357	Neumarkt	LK Neumarkt i. d. Opf.	1st Lt W N Blanton
I-358	Sulzbach-Rosenburg	LK Sulzbach-Rosenburg	Capt S. E. Prail
Co H	Regensburg		1st Lt C G Savelli
G-243	Passau	SK-LK Passau	Lt Col F W Hanger
G-245	Landshut	SK-LK Landshut	Capt A J Wann
G-246	Straubing	SK-LK Straubing	Maj H T Olsen
H-301	Deggendorf	LK Deggendorf	Capt L C Smallenberger
H-302	Eggenfelden	LK Eggenfelden	Maj E W Manning
H-303	Grafenau	LK Grafenau	Capt S Perlman
H-304	Kelheim	LK Kelheim	Capt O DeBogdan
H-305	Landau	LK Landau a. d. Isar	Maj R M Stribling
H-306	Pfarrkirchen	LK Pfarrkirchen	Capt W D Baird
H-307	Zweisel	LK Regen	Capt A R Sphar
H-308	Vilshofen	LK Vilshofen	Capt W. J. Fitzpatrick
H-309	Vilsbiburg	LK Vilsbiburg	Capt J W Fleshman
H-310	Freyung	LK Wolfstein	Capt R W Douglass
I-375	Bogen	LK Bogen	Capt A G Albert
I-377	Dingolfing	LK Dingolfing	Capt B E Reichhardt
I-378	Griesbach	LK Griesbach	Capt A S Gallant

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
I-379	Kötzing	LK Kötzing	1st Lt A Smolens
I-380	Mainburg	LK Mainburg	Capt W Wickersham
I-381	Mallersdorf	LK Mallersdorf	Capt S R Jacobs
I-382	Rottenburg	LK Rottenburg	Capt E A Russo
I-383	Viechtach	LK Viechtach	Capt J F Vaile
I-385	Wegscheid	LK Wegscheid	Capt H Walter

Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern

Co F	Munich		1st Lt J MacDonough
E-205	Munich	RB Oberbayern	Lt Col J W Hensel
F-213	Munich	SK-LS Munich	Lt Col E Keller Jr
G-236	Partenkirchen	LK Garmisch-Partenkirchen	Maj C H Heyl (actg)
G-237	Ingolstadt	SK-LK Ingolstadt	Capt L H Norlins
G-238	Munich	LK Munich	Maj M T Mawrence
H-286	Fürstenfeldbruck	LK Fürstenfeldbruck	Capt J J McBride
H-287	Landsberg	LK Landsberg	Capt C A Rein
H-288	Pfaffenhofen	LK Pfaffenhofen	Maj C A Sloat
H-289	Starnberg	LK Starnberg	Capt M Shellenberger
H-290	Weilheim	LK Weilheim	Maj E C Wills
H-291	Wolftratshausen	LK Wolftratshausen	Capt C H Bischoff
I-362	Alchach	LK Alchach	Capt L. R. Day
I-364	Schrobenhausen	LK Schrobenhausen	Capt R G Hill Jr
I-365	Munich	Bavarian Supply	Capt F S Franke
I-367	Dachau	LK Dachau	1st Lt V A Burke
I-368	Schöngau	LK Schöngau	Maj C E Carlsen
Co E	Wasserburg		Capt J T Collier
G-231	Freising	LK Freising	Maj A G Snow
G-232	Miesbach	LK Miesbach	Maj L L Haupt
G-233	Traunstein	LK Traunstein	Maj F L Tracy
G-234	Altötting	LK Altötting	Maj R L Montague
G-235	Rosenheim	SK-LK Rosenheim	Maj R G MacDonald
H-280	Erding	LK Erding	Capt H J Bierman
H-281	Laufen	LK Laufen	Capt S L Jones Jr
H-282	Mühldorf	LK Mühldorf	Maj C E Vickerman
H-285	Wasserburg	LK Wasserburg	Capt M J Groves
H-284	Bad Tolz	LK Tolz	Maj J Letteriello
H-285	Aibling	LK Aibling	Maj E J Newmeyer
H-311	Berchtesgaden	LK Berchtersgaden	Maj M E DiPietro
I-361	Ebersberg	LK Ebersberg	Maj G E Horwarth

Regierungsbezirk Schwaben

Co G	Ziemetshausen		1st Lt O Meirhenry
E-206	Augsburg	RB Schwaben	Col R L Hiles
F-214	Augsburg	SK-LK Augsburg	Lt Col R A Norton
G-239	Dillingen	LK Dillingen	Maj C F Baker
G-240	Weissenhorn	LK Neu Ulm	Maj J A Blakemore
G-241	Sonthofen	LK Sonthofen	Maj A B Ebbers
G-242	Kempten	SK-LK Kempten	1st Lt B M Ziegler
H-292	Donaauwörth	LK Donaauwörth	Maj H L Snapp
H-293	Günzburg	LK Günzburg	Capt J G Horrell
H-294	Markt Oberdorf	LK Markt Oberdorf	Capt J O Renalds
H-295	Memmingen	LK Memmingen	Maj R F Wagner
H-296	Mindelheim	LK Mindelheim	Maj E C Bunker
H-297	Neuberg	LK Neuberg a. d. Donau	Capt W H Oswalt
H-298	Nördlingen	LK Nördlingen	Capt S H Brown
H-299	Füssen	LK Füssen	Capt T R Schweer
H-300	Krumbach	LK Krumbach	1st Lt L. E. Dunn
I-369	Illertissen	LK Illertissen	1st Lt F E Kettunen
I-370	Kaufbeuren	LK Kaufbeuren	Maj E M Ross
I-372	Wertingen	LK Wertingen	Capt R E Hale
I-373	Friedberg	LK Friedberg	Maj P S Webb
I-374	Schwabmünchen	LK Schwabmünchen	1st Lt L E Smith

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
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U. S. SECTOR, BERLIN DISTRICT

Office of
Mil Govt
(U. S. Sector
Berlin) Berlin

U. S. Sector, Berlin District
(APO 755)

Col F L Howley

Detachments Disbanded:

2d Mil Govt Regt:

Co B: G-36, H-59, H-60

Co C: H-69, H-71

Co D: H-81

R & T Co

RR Det (Liaison)

Note: Orders for the change of station to Munich of the 3d
Mil Govt Regt Hqs Elements have been rescinded.